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RESEARCH NOTE
The Challenges of Intelligence
Sharing in Romania
FLORINA CRISTIANA (CRIS) MATEI
ABSTRACT The twenty-first century’s security environment has triggered a
phenomenon of ‘proliferation’ of intelligence and security cooperation, both
domestically and internationally. After the ousting of the communist regime (whose
intelligence system served the regime) in 1989, Romania embarked upon democratic
reform of its new intelligence system (including strengthening cooperation), to better
tackle the current security challenges. This has been a rather onerous process, yet
worthwhile: Romania’s intelligence is presently cooperating well with national and
international partners, to counter national, regional, and global security threats. This
paper assesses Romania’s efforts in developing intelligence cooperation, after the
demise of the communist regime.
Introduction
Although not an outcome of the end of the cold war, cooperation in the
realm of intelligence, both nationally and internationally, has evolved
significantly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. The twenty-first century’s
security environment is variegated, unpredictable and extremely dynamic.
Poverty, corruption, isolation of minorities, failed states, organized crime,
terrorism, pandemic disease, natural disasters, climate change are but a few
security dangers, which not only are in a perpetual transformation, but are
also interlocking and overlapping, showing how volatile the boundaries
between these menaces are.1 The geographic borders between countries are
no longer fixed, although this is what terrorists may want the governments
to think: the actual borders are ‘delineated’ by terrorist activities, organized
crime and money laundering.
1Today there is no clear distinction between domestic and foreign threats. Peter Wilson,
‘Preparing to Meet New Challenges’ in Steve Tsang (ed.) Intelligence and Human Rights in
the Era of Global Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2007) p.114.
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It is difficult for governments, even if possessing superb intelligence
collection and analysis assets, to fight these threats, without adjusting and
cooperating. Despite the United States’ unparalleled defense and intelligence
capabilities, the lack of coordination and cooperation among security
agencies, as well as superficial international cooperation, resulted in the
intelligence ‘failure’ of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.2 Terrorist
groups are complex, easily adjustable networks, which governments are not;
to effectively avert current threats, government institutions (including
intelligence) need to become less ‘adiabatic’ and more cooperative and
flexible.3 It was the cooperation of British intelligence and law enforcement
organizations that led to the prevention of the ‘liquid bomb’ terrorist threat in
August 2006. Grappling with such complex dangers requires more
coordination and information sharing at the national level (i.e. among
intelligence, law enforcement, and judiciary), establishing partnerships with
civil society, and enhancing cooperation with other nations’ intelligence
communities, yet without endangering or disclosing intelligence agencies’
sources and methods, used to accomplish either their shared or distinct goals.
To this end, concepts such as ‘interagency cooperation’, ‘intelligence sharing’,
‘need to share versus need to know’, ‘intelligence partnerships’, ‘collective/
cooperative security’, and ‘security is everyone’s business’, have become
pointers for national security strategies, intelligence reform, education,
training and doctrines, as well as international alliances, as an attempt to fill
in a gap resulting from the post-cold war transition from a ‘puzzle
intelligence’ (visualizing the answers) to a ‘mystery intelligence’ (not knowing
or visualizing the answers).
Traumatic terrorist attacks in the US (2001), Spain (2004), and the UK
(2005) created a sense of urgency to reform intelligence, create networks and
share intelligence (including cooperation with foreign counterparts), in order
to avoid future failures. As in other transformation endeavors, the process of
instituting and strengthening interagency cooperation has been cumbersome:
domestically, information sharing between national intelligence agencies
continues to be restricted; internationally, the information/intelligence flow
is seldom equal, nor have all intelligence sharing and cooperative efforts
been equally welcomed by nations. Notwithstanding, the increase in
intelligence sharing and cooperation since 9/11 has been responsible for
successful outcomes in the war against terrorism.4
2Twenty eight per cent of the 340 intelligence recommendations issued by the 9/11
Commission Reports, emphasized the need to strengthen interagency cooperation and
coordination. Amy Zegart, Spying Blind. The CIA, the FBI and the origins of 9/11 (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press 2007) p.35.
3Anthony Glees uses the concept of ‘fighting networks with networks’. Anthony Glees, ‘The
British Search for a New Intelligence System’ in Tsang (ed.) Intelligence and Human Rights in
the Era of Global Terrorism, p.152.
4Stephane Lefebvre, ‘The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Coopera-
tion’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16 (2003) pp.527–42;
G.P.H. Kruys, ‘The Role of Intelligence in Countering Terrorism and Insurgency’, Strategic


































Intelligence cooperation is not a new concept for Romania’s intelligence
system either, but its purpose, after the demise of the communist
regime, is different: it shifted from ensuring the security of the regime (to
the detriment of the population) to the security of the country (in the
service of the population). It is very well known that Romania’s
communist intelligence apparatus (the Securitate) collaborated with the
military and/or other components of the police, as well as with
international organized crime and terrorism groups (including the cold
war terrorist Carlos ‘the Jackal’), in order to achieve its pernicious goals
against Romanians. But today, the Romanian intelligence community (IC)
understands that ‘security is everyone’s business’ and cooperates with its
national and international partners to fight the national, regional and
global security threats. Romania is at the beginning of such cooperative
process.
This paper assesses Romania’s intelligence domestic and international
cooperative endeavors after the end of communism in 1989 and transition to
democracy. There is little in-depth information on how cooperation works
(i.e. with regard to collection or analysis) to enable researchers to properly
quantify said cooperation, but given the available information, one could
argue that the intelligence system has slowly progressed toward a working
community.
Romanian Intelligence Community Cooperation Efforts: Per Aspera ad
Astra
The Need for Cooperation: Current Threats to Romania’s Security
Romania is currently confronting dangers deriving from poverty, corruption,
neighboring failed states, organized crime, terrorism, pandemic disease,
natural disasters and others. It does not have a ‘direct’ Muslim threat (as
does the US or UK) since, on the one hand, the Muslim/Arab population in
Romania is better integrated in the society than in other countries, and, on
the other hand, there is a warm relationship between Romania and Arab and
Muslim world going back to the cold war. Even so, Romania’s friendly
relations with the US, the implementation of the 2005 Treaty on relocation
of US military bases in Romania in late 2007 and the participation of the
Romanian troops in the war on terrorism and peace operations could make
Romania a target.
Romania unquestionably needs a concerted mechanism of intelligence,
law enforcement and judicial efforts to cope with these threats. Likewise,
Romania’s IC needs to contribute, together with other nations to the
regional and global security.
Review for Southern Africa, 1 May 2007; B. Raman, ‘The Intelligence Game’, The Rediff
Special, 21 February 2003; ‘New EU Treaty Worries US Intel Services’, Jane’s Intelligence
Digest, 18 January 2008.


































Cooperation at National Level: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (Reversing
the Order . . .)
Currently, Romania has six intelligence agencies: the Romanian Intelligence
Service (SRI), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), the Guard and
Protection Service (SPP), the Special Telecommunication Service (STS), the
Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Directorate for General Information of the
Armed Forces (DGIA), and the Ministry of Interior and Administrative
Reform’s (MIRA) General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal
Protection (DGIPI). Interagency cooperation is based on a series of laws
and regulations, some of them established immediately after 1989, which
encompass, among other, the Constitution of Romania, the Law on
National Security, the National Security Strategy, the Doctrine of
Intelligence, Doctrine of Combating Terrorism, Military Strategy and
Doctrine.
Even with a rather solid legal framework for cooperation, developing
security cooperation in Romania has been an onerous process, due to
agencies’ bureaucratic environment (which hinders information sharing and
collaboration), too many intelligence agencies (which fueled dishonest
competition and rivalry among agencies, because of redundancy and
overlapping roles and missions) and agencies’ politicization. Besides,
creating a National Intelligence Community (CNI) was delayed for years
due to Romania’s confrontational politics (constant fights between the
president and prime minister with regard to lion’s share of security and
intelligence matters, a consequence of the semi-presidential system), the
reluctance of heads of intelligence agencies (which feared that a law on CNI
would impose specific constraints on their roles and missions), and the
public’s fear of a ‘return of the Securitate’ (caused by the continuity of
former Securitate personnel in all intelligence services after 1989).
Regardless of these challenges, Romania’s intelligence agencies have been
working toward becoming a community, acting jointly to prevent and
counter national security dangers. Although the intelligence agencies are
entitled by the legislation listed above to receive information from all public
and private institutions, additional bilateral and multilateral cooperation
protocols have been established to deepen cooperation and coordination
among intelligence agencies and other organizations dealing with security
issues.5 Based on these agreements, the intelligence agencies (and other
security institutions) have been exchanging and sharing information,
assisting each other with personnel, education and training, and participat-
ing in field operations together. To expedite intelligence sharing, an
Integrated Information System (SII) was created in 2003 within SRI, a
gigantic storage center of data gathered from all state institutions. Despite
civil society’s blistering criticism (due to the lack of transparency of SII’s
5Armand Gosu, Interview with Sergiu Medar, President’s Advisor for Defense and Security,
Revista 22, No.850, 23–29 June 2006; 5http://www.sie.ro/Arhiva/es1.html4; 5http://
www.sie.ro/Arhiva/es2.html4; 5http://www.sri.ro4; 5www.mae.ro4; 5http://www.mai.
gov.ro4; 5http://www.mapn.ro4; and Profil, No.8 (August 2005).


































legal framework and lack of control mechanisms), SII has eased information
sharing, in that it made possible instant access to certain data.6
The unitary coordination of Romania’s security activity is ensured by the
National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), composed of the president, the
prime minister, the minister of industry and trade, the minister of defense,
the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, the head of the
Political Analysis Department of the Presidency, the SRI/SIE directors, and
the chief of staff. CSAT coordinates the actions of all security institutions,
informs and advises the president on national security and defense issues,
produces security-related documents, and integrates all information pro-
vided by the intelligence agencies and other national security institutions.7
CNI – ‘Apple of Discord’ or the ‘Gordian Knot’ of enhanced interagency
cooperation?. On 18 November 2005, CSAT set up Romania’s National
Intelligence Community, which serves as a supreme coordination body of the
activity of all current intelligence agencies, as well as an integrated structure,
which provides a centralized processing of intelligence gathered by all its
components, and disseminates it to relevant consumers.8
Although both government and civil society representatives considered the
creation of the CNI imperative, it generated a series of controversies and
criticism by the prime minister, current and former politicians and public
authorities, as well as civil society representatives. The main issue is CNI’s
flimsy legal basis: critics argue that CNI cannot function without the
modification of laws on organization and functioning of CSAT (which does
not allow CSAT to set up any structure) on the one hand, and on the CNI
components on the other hand (which stipulate the agencies’ independence
and autonomy versus being part and parcel of a CNI). The lack of
parliamentary control of CNI is also problematic. Since it was not explicitly
stipulated in the CNI decision, such control does not exist; moreover, the
inclusion of members of Parliamentary oversight committees in some of the
CNI structures could jeopardize the objectivity of the legislative control/
oversight of each CNI component. Other controversies include: the
6The Laws on the Integrated Information System (SII) adopted by a CSAT classified
resolution were followed by government decision number 952 of August 2003, which was
made public (this was needed as the set up of SII would have been impossible otherwise).
Ondine Ghergut and Sorin Ghica, ‘Legile pentru Sistemul Integrat, secrete de stat’, Romania
Libera, 23 April 2007.
7Law 415/2002, at 5http://csat.presidency.ro/index.php?page¼lege_of4; and Sever Voi-
nescu and Dudu Ionescu, ‘The Supreme Council of National Defense: The Main Instrument
of Decisionmaking’, Institute for Public Policy, Bucharest, June 2005; Constantin Monac,
‘Parlamentul si Securitatea Nationala’ (Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial 2006) p.103.
8Romania: Secret Services to Solve the Problems of Integration in EU’, Axis, 23 January 2006.
For more information on the members and functions of the CNI subsidiaries, see 5http://
csat.presidency.ro/csat/index.php?page¼cp&cp¼224; Miruna Munteanu and Razvan Io-
nescu, ‘Reforma serviciilor secrete romanesti, capcane si jaloane, CNI – o noua viziune asupra
informatiilor (2)’, Ziua, 14 January 2006; Dan Badea, ‘Comunitatea Nationala de Informatii
infiintata de Traian Basescu este in afara legii’, Gardianul, 24 November 2005.


































redundancy between CNI and CSAT (i.e. one of CNI’s subsidiaries appears
to duplicate and even surpass CSAT’s attributions); the lack of grounds for
including certain members in the CNI subsidiaries (i.e. the minister of
foreign affairs and minister of justice, who do not have intelligence services
under their subordination); the uncertainty regarding CNI’s budget (whether
provided by the presidential administration or each intelligence agency); the
security clearance (the inclusion of civil society representatives and other
experts raise serious issues regarding the observance of Law number 182 of
2002 on access to classified information); and, the apparent increase of the
number of intelligence agencies after the creation of the CNI. And, since
national security and intelligence have always represented an ‘Apple of
Discord’ between the prime minister and the president, critics view CNI as a
‘trick’ to increase the president’s control over the intelligence services, to the
detriment of the prime minister.9
Despite these problems, the CNI started to function on 7 December 2005,
when the Office of Integrated Intelligence was established. It produced the
first ten-page intelligence bulletin on 3 January 2006 (comprising raw
information and detailed analyses of the issues of importance for the
decision makers). Progressively, the daily briefs have been complemented by
special syntheses on the development of specific activity pertaining to
national security, while dissemination from CSAT members was expanded
to parliamentary committees. Through the annual plan of intelligence
priorities for intelligence agencies, approved by CSAT, the CNI ensures
duplications and overlapping are avoided between CNI and individual briefs
from each service.10
Thus the CNI seems to serve its purpose: increase intelligence agencies’
effectiveness and professionalism (by eliminating parallel functions and
waste of human and material resources), and generate a functional
intelligence partnership (with the agencies preserving their specific roles
and missions but enjoying a better coordination of their strategic activities),
based on professional versus unfair competition. It is an integrated analysis
‘laboratory’ rather than an extra intelligence service, as it has no operative
attributions. Its coordination through the CSAT (which includes the
president, the prime minister and various ministers) reduces the risk of
being President Basescu’s ‘hijacking’ of the intelligence agencies. Since CNI
needed a statutory law approved by the legislature, a draft CNI law has been
under parliament’s debate for almost three years (as part of a new national
security law package), which stipulates parliamentary control and provides
for an increased role for the prime minister in the CNI (i.e. CNI’s head
9Munteanu and Ionescu, ‘Reforma serviciilor secrete romanesti’; Badea, ‘Comunitatea
Nationala de Informatii’; and ‘Om de ı̂ncredere’ ı̂n funcţia de consilier prezidenţial pe
probleme de securitate’, BBC in Romanian, 16 March 2007; Romulus Georgescu, ‘Serviciile
secrete se incaiera pentru suprematia in Comunitatea de Informatii’, Romania Libera, 29
March 2005.
10Armand Gosu, Interview with Sergiu Medar, President’s Advisor for Defense and Security,
Revista 22, No.850, 23–29 June 2006.


































would be appointed by the president, at the prime minister’s suggestion).
Once approved, the law would reduce skepticism toward the CNI.11
Reaching out to civil society and the general population. Opening toward
civil society (the media, think tanks, opinion groups, non-governmental
organizations) was perhaps the most difficult cooperative effort undertaken
by the intelligence agencies, due to a mutual mistrust between the IC and
civil society: IC considered civil society (especially the media) sensationalist
and incapable of handling national security information professionally,
while civil society considered that the IC did not seriously undertake
democratic reform, and lacked transparency and accountability. In spite of a
relatively robust legal framework on transparency (to include a Freedom of
Information Act), occasionally intelligence agencies would invoke national
security for not disclosing information to civil society. Sometimes, even
though civil society would win a case to access information, access would
still be impossible (as the prosecutor ignored the court order); and even when
civil society sued the prosecutor and won, information would not be released
until the media got involved.12
Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have eventually established partner-
ships with public authorities, academia, NGOs, journalists, etc., to increase
their awareness of the need for effective intelligence in Romania, including
civil society’s involvement in the development of various studies on
parliamentary control of intelligence; NGO participation in debating laws
pertaining to national security or government transparency; access to IC
press releases and websites; the possibility for journalists to interview
intelligence officials; participation of NGOs, media and other civil society
groups in joint meetings with IC members. In addition, SRI leadership has
mentioned the possibility of using the media, NGOs and representatives of
academia for prevention of specific national security threats and challenges.
Moreover, in compliance with Romania’s strategy of combating terrorism,
which stipulates cooperation with civil society, the intelligence agencies have
established joint programs to train the population on national security. The
campaign entitled ‘Terrorism . . . Near Us’, conducted by SRI with the
support of the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication
Management (EURISC) and other non-governmental institutions, enables
SRI to travel to various high schools and universities in Romania to train the
students on what the security threats are, what SRI and its anti-terrorist
11Romania’s National Security Strategy; ‘Marius Oprea: ‘‘B!asescu nu vrea s!a ı̂mpart!a
serviciile cu liberalii’’’, Ziarul de Mures, 27 March 2006, 5http://www.ziaruldemures.ro/
archiva.php?yearID¼2006&monthID¼44 ‘Om de ı̂ncredere’ ı̂n funcţia de consilier
prezidenţial pe probleme de securitate’, BBC in Romanian, 16 March 2007; Armand Gosu,
Interview with Sergiu Medar.
12Monica Macovei, ‘The Secret Policeman’s Fall: In Post-Communist Romania, the
Government is Making Real Progress towards Transparency and Openness’, Guardian
Unlimited, 26 October 2006.


































brigade can do to counter these threats, and what the population can do to
help the intelligence community avert such threats.13
Cooperation at the International Level
Romania has been interested in cooperating with international partners;
particularly joining the European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions,
and establishing a partnership with the US. But, at first, cooperation with
foreign countries was difficult and Romania remained isolated from the
West, as many NATO and Western counterparts were reluctant to share
information with IC personnel who had previously worked for the
Securitate; one of the grave problems in Romanian IC transition to
democracy was the continuation of former Securitate personnel in both
the IC and other government positions. NATO/EU more or less ordered
Romania to dismiss these personnel in order to be considered for
membership in those organizations.14 Paradoxically, however, in the Foreign
Intelligence Service’s situation, those who worried about the retirement of
the former Securitate personnel were SIE’s partners. A former SIE director
explained this by arguing that a relationship with a partner agency requires
years and becomes personal, in that agents know each other very well and
trust each other,15 and any breach in such relationship may affect the
effectiveness of cooperation.
Cooperation was strengthened after Romania started to undertake a more
serious overhaul of its security and intelligence agencies (which led to NATO
and EU membership), establish agreements of cooperation with counterparts
abroad, and especially after Romania became an effective contributor with
troops (including intelligence) to different peace operations and war on
terror missions, together with foreign partners.
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation. All Romanian IC members have
established specific intelligence sharing and exchange mechanisms with
foreign partners, through various bilateral and multilateral channels,
stemming from common preoccupations, needs and perceptions, as well as
shared threats. Cooperation is ensured through information sharing, mutual
support, visits and joint training.
13Andreea Nicolae and Costel Oprea, ‘Din SRI va disparea ierarhia militara’, Romania
Libera, 11 November 2007, 5http://www.sri.ro4.
14For more information, see the following: Cristiana Matei, ‘Romania’s Transition to
Democracy and the Role of the Press in Intelligence Reform’ in Thomas C. Bruneau and
Steven C. Boraz (eds.) Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and
Effectiveness (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press 2007); and Florina Cristiana (Cris)
Matei, ‘Romania’s Intelligence Community: From an Instrument of Dictatorship to Serving
Democracy’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20/4 (2007)
pp.629–60.
15Ioana Lupea Razvan Ionescu, ‘Claudiu Saftoiu, seful SIE, la Interviurile ‘‘2þ 1’’’,
Evenimentul Zilei, 28 December 2006.


































The partners of Romania’s intelligence agencies include, inter alia, the
National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Secret Service, MI6, and France’s guard and
protection service. Besides exchange of information, Romania’s partners
have provided Romanian IC with financial and procurement support.
Canadian counterparts provided SPP during the Francophone countries’
summit in Bucharest in 2006 with modern communication and command
technical devices. The US assisted DGIA to connect Romania to the system
of communications monitoring through satellite (MONSAT) and to the NSA
system which operates SIGINT network. The Netherlands has also assisted
Romania to install on its territory the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
equipment of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands.
And, to deepen cooperation, in particular with regard to organized crime, an
FBI office opened in 2001 in Bucharest.16
With regard to multinational cooperation mechanisms, Romania is a
member of NATO, EU, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)
Center for Combating Trans Border Crime, European Network and Informa-
tion Security Agency (ENSIA), European Police Office (EUROPOL), Interna-
tional Bomb Data Center, Balkan Communication Network, and the like.
To ease cooperation and address information-sharing opportunities and
challenges, Romanian IC has organized a series of meetings and workshops
on security matters, such as the NATO–Ukraine Working Group Meeting in
Bucharest, in October 2007, which focused on democratic civilian control of
the security institutions and intelligence reform; regular meetings of the
Romanian IC with the NATO Office of Security (NOS), which ensures
NATO’s security policy coordination, monitoring and implementation, one
of the most recent meetings being held in January 2007 to address the security
measures for the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest; the hosting in June
2007 of the Annual Conference of Balkan Communication Network entitled
‘EU and NATO Acting Together in SEE – The Role of the NGOs Networks’
the organization of the sixth meeting of the International Bomb Data Center
in Bucharest, in February 2008; participation in the Black Sea and Caspian
Sea Symposium of the International Intelligence Forum, in the US in 2006 and
in Romania in 2007; the hosting of the International Seminar ‘Combating
Terrorism. NATO and Trans-Atlantic Dimension’ in 2002, which gathered
together representatives of intelligence and law enforcement organizations
from various NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. During this
meeting, the assistant legal attaché of the United States Embassy in Romania
16Doru Dragomir, ‘Armata pe faras – Lipsa de preocupare a ministrilor liberali ai Apararii si
jocurile din interiorul serviciului secret militar pun in pericol siguranta Romaniei’, Ziua, 28
May 2007; Ionescu, ‘Claudiu Saftoiu’; Nicolae and Oprea, ‘Din SRI va disparea ierarhia
militara’; Radu Tudor, ‘Lista teroristilor expulzati din Romania Numarul acestora a atins 70
in ultimii doi ani PKK si Lupii Cenusii sunt organizatiile cu cea mai numeroasa prezenta in
randul indezirabililor’, Ziua, 16 February 2002; ‘Directorul FBI despre modernizarea SRI’,
Cronica Romana, 15 November 2006; Bogdan Chireac, ‘Interview with SRI Director George-
Cristian Maior’, Pro Vest, 26 November 2006; and STS 2006 Activity Report, Tricolorul.


































expressed his appreciation regarding the excellent work between the FBI
office and Romanian intelligence and law enforcement organizations.17
Romania has been part of the European Police Office (the EU’s criminal
intelligence agency) since 2004. As a member, Romania has participated in
regular meetings with EUROPOL and facilitated information and intelli-
gence sharing with the European Police Office on crime-related issues.18 The
National EUROPOL Unit, established within the Romanian Ministry of
Interior in 2004, ensures liaison with EUROPOL, easing the information
flow between Romania and EUROPOL members. Between January and
October 2006, for instance, the National Unit enabled the exchange of 2571
operational messages (644 on forged credit cards, 516 on fraud and
smuggling, 494 on terrorism, 414 on drug trafficking, 200 on human
trafficking, 181 on currency forgery and 122 on illegal migration) between
Romania, Spain, Germany, Italy, France and Hungary.19
The SECI Regional Center has been a very effective tool for countering
organized crime cooperation in the region. A recent example of success is
Operation ‘RING’ completed in 2007 – a drug trafficking case, which
involved a Turkish criminal organization active in Romania and Turkey
aiming to sell drugs in the Netherlands, the destination country. Through
cooperation and information sharing between Romanian and Turkish law
enforcement agencies, and with the assistance and support of the German
and Dutch law enforcement agencies, in mid-December 2007, all the
intelligence gathered urged immediate intervention, thus at the Turkish–
Bulgarian border the Turkish authorities seized 58 kg of heroin (hidden in a
Turkish truck), which resulted in immediate arrests in both Romania and
Turkey. The Turkish officers detained 11 persons, while the Romanians
arrested the head of the criminal organization and two lieutenants.20
Participation in cooperative operations. Romania also contributes to
international peace, stability and reconstruction operations in cooperation
with allies and partners: in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, with National
Intelligence Cells (RONIC) integrated in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) intelligence formation; in
Afghanistan, with a Detachment of Intelligence and Counterintelligence within




nav=comunicate&dnav=detalii&id=2324; The ‘Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposium’
book, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, NDIC Press, Washington DC; and 5http://
www.ispaim.ro/pdf/terrorism.pdf4.







































with a Military Intelligence Detachment in the Multinational Division Center
South. Romania has a liaison officer integrated within the coalition
intelligence center in Tampa, Florida, to do collection and analysis, as well
as to coordinate the troops participating in ‘Enduring Freedom’.21
Romania is one of the few NATO members able to organize, prepare and
deploy in operations theaters complex intelligence structures to include Human
Intelligence (HUMINT), SIGINT, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), multi-
source analysis capabilities collections, and, as well, to ensure the specialized
logistic support (specific communications, technical devices maintenance, and
training and rotation of personnel). In 2003, the Special Detachment Iraq was
established composed of a SIGINT structure conducting specialized/focused
collection missions such as internal and external political environment, area
leaders and their motivations/incentives, economic factors, cultural and
religious factors, ethnic relations, organizations and institutions active in the
region , police and paramilitary forces, terrorist groups and other organiza-
tions. In September 2005, the intelligence cell in Kandahar was completed by a
SIGINT component for collection through radio monitoring of the terrorist
groups in Afghanistan and its neighbors.22
HUMINT capablities are highly desired within the Atlantic Alliance, and
Romania is one of the few Allies possessing excellent HUMINT assets. In Iraq,
for example, effective HUMINT collection by Coalition forces were possible
due to the historical closeness between Romanian and Iraqi people, which made
Iraqis more open to the Romanian troops than to the other Coalition forces.23
Likewise, SPP officers ensure the protection of various UN officials in
Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the SPP professionalism and expertise,
the UN Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, Sir David Veness,
was interested in establishing a center of excellence in Romania, in support
of UN activities, which will have a training component, as well as a research
and development component.24
Conclusion
Establishing a functional cooperation among intelligence agencies and other
national security institutions has been problematic in many long established
democracies: the United States’ intelligence organizations have tried to do so
since the early 1940s and France’s agencies since early 1990s. Moreover,
despite the reorganization in the United States after 9/11, many argue that
the intelligence system is yet to become an effective community.25 For
21Matei, ‘Romania’s Intelligence Community’.
22Dragomir, ‘Armata pe faras’.
23Radu Dobritoiu, ‘Luptatorii din Umbra’, Observatorul Militar, Number 41, 12–18 October
2005.
245http://www.spp.ro/conferinta_presa1.htm4.
25Siobhan Gorman argued in 2003 that there was still need the FBI and CIA to strengthen
communicating and understanding ‘each other’s aspirations and perspectives’. Siobhan
Gorman, ‘CIA, FBI Remain Worlds Apart’, National Journal, August 2003.


































Romania, such a process is even more difficult. As has been the case for
intelligence reform in general, the evolution of interagency cooperation in
Romania has been hampered by a series of challenges, including the legacy
of the Securitate, bureaucratic obstacles, protracted scandals and rivalries
among intelligence agencies, attempts to politicize intelligence, conflicts
between political figures and the like. Of late, however, as the number of
‘unknowns’ in the global ‘security equation’ mounted, the intelligence
agencies have understood they serve a common purpose – the security of
the country and its citizens (even if, by law, they have different
responsibilities).
The creation of the controversial CNI, which appears to have raised more
questions than answers with regard to interagency cooperation, in that there is
no statutory law for it and it lacks transparency and accountability, seems to be
serving its objective. Its supporters asserted that the CSAT’s decision to create
the CNI was the ‘most important decision taken in the field of national security
in the last fifteen years’.26 Obviously, the establishment of such a community
has been necessary for fair competition among services and to provide the
decision makers with integrated intelligence briefs/products (which is actually
happening, through the Office for Integrated Intelligence). Likewise, since the
CSAT is the major intelligence consumer, creating the CNI within the Council
made perfect sense. Even so, CNI needs an organic/statutory law approved by
the parliament and needs to be under democratic control.
Asked in an interview in 2006 whether or not there still existed unfair
competition among intelligence agencies in Romania, former SIE director
Claudiu Saftoiu claimed that this was no longer the case. Likewise, the SPP
director stated that the ‘communication’ between SPP and the other
intelligence agencies had improved greatly since he took office.27
At the international level, Romania’s intelligence community has changed its
status from a ‘pariah’ to a trustworthy ally, as shown by reiterated
commendation of the professionalism and effectiveness of the Romanian IC
by its international counterparts. The SPP, whose officers ensure the protection
of UN officials in Sudan and Afghanistan has repeatedly received praise from
the United Nations.28 Likewise, SRI and SIE are viewed as among the most
reliable and credible services by NATO, EU and other intelligence agencies.
In conclusion, Romania has made major strides in developing an effective
intelligence system through, among other measures, the development of
specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms; the Romanian IC’s
cooperative actions alongside national law enforcement institutions,
judiciary and civil society, as well as with international intelligence systems,
have proven that a ‘one for all, all for one’ approach matters when it comes
to national, regional or global security.
26Badea, ‘Comunitatea Nationala de Informatii’.
27Ionescu, ‘Claudiu Saftoiu’; Bogdan Stoleru, Interview with SPP Director Lucian Pahontu,
Cronica Romana, Special Edition, 16 December 2006.
28Bogdan Stoleru, Interview.
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